Implementing the State Duty to Consult in Land and Resource Decisions: Perspectives from Sami Communities and Swedish State Officials by Kløcker Larsen, Rasmus & Raitio, Kaisa
Arctic Review on Law and Politics
Vol. 10, 2019, pp. 4–23
4
Peer-reviewed article
© 2019 Rasmus Kløcker Larsen & Kaisa Raitio. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Cre-
ative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), 
allowing third parties to share their work (copy, distribute, transmit) and to adapt it, under the condition that the authors 
are given credit, that the work is not used for commercial purposes, and that in the event of reuse or distribution, the terms 
of this license are made clear.
Citation: Rasmus Kløcker Larsen & Kaisa Raitio. “Implementing the state duty to consult in land and resource decisions: 
Perspectives from Sami communities and Swedish state officials” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 10, 2019, pp. 4–23. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v10.1323
*Correspondence to: Rasmus Kløcker Larsen, email: rasmus.klocker.larsen@sei.org
Implementing the State Duty to Consult 
in Land and Resource Decisions: 
Perspectives from Sami Communities 
and Swedish State Officials
Rasmus Kløcker Larsen* 
Stockholm Environment Institute
Kaisa Raitio
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Abstract
The duty of states to consult indigenous communities is a well-established legal principle, but its 
implications for practice remain uncertain. Sweden is finding itself at a particularly critical juncture as 
it prepares to legislate a duty to consult the Sami people in line with its international obligations. This 
paper explores the ability of Swedish state actors to implement the duty to consult, based on lessons 
from an already existing duty set out in Swedish minority law, namely to ensure the effective participa-
tion of minorities in land and resource decisions. Presenting novel empirical material on the views of 
Sami communities and state officials in ministries and agencies, we demonstrate the existence of con-
siderable implementation gaps linked to practice, sectoral legislation, and political discourse. We argue 
that if state duties are to promote the intended intercultural reconciliation, then new measures are 
needed to ensure enforcement, e.g. via mechanisms of appeal and rules of nullification. In addition, 
sectoral resource regulations should be amended to refer to the duties set out in minority law and/or 
a potential new bill on consultation duty in a consistent manner. In the near-term, the state should 
ensure that Sami communities are adequately resourced to engage in consultation and should invest 
in state authorities’ own ability to implement, i.e. through competence development, staffing, intersec-
toral coordination, and independent evaluation. Much could also be gained if state agencies and Sami 
communities worked together to develop detailed consultation routines for relevant resource sectors. 
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1. Introduction
One of the cornerstones of international indigenous rights law established in recent 
decades is the principle of the duty to consult, i.e. the duty of states to consult indige-
nous communities before planning resource developments on traditional lands. Sev-
eral international conventions and declarations outline what is variously expressed 
as procedural or participatory rights, including: the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the International Labor Organiza-
tion’s Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.1 
Such procedural or participatory rights are important, first and foremost, since they 
function as a means of ensuring indigenous influence in decision making and giving 
effect to their substantive rights to land, resources and culture.2 While UNDRIP is 
not binding and ILO 169 remains unratified by many states, they influence the inter-
pretation of older, binding conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which recognize the right of indigenous peoples to practice their 
culture, and highlight the duty to consult as a central means to protect this right.
A central question in the enactment of the duty to consult regards the degree 
of influence affected indigenous communities should have on state decisions, i.e. 
the relationship between “consultation” and “consent”. To be sure, debate among 
legal scholars continues on this matter.3 One common interpretation is that the 
state must genuinely seek but not necessarily reach agreement with indigenous com-
munities prior to resource developments.4 However, in light of the conclusions of 
human rights monitoring bodies, indigenous peoples have a right to give or with-
hold consent, with a qualified right to veto in cases where decisions on large–scale 
projects may significantly jeopardize their livelihoods.5 How this duty should be 
implemented concretely in decision-making linked to land and resources will vary 
between jurisdictions, since practice is not, and cannot be, specified in international 
law. Past research has aptly shown how, globally, the concrete implication of the duty 
of states to consult indigenous communities has been interpreted and applied in 
highly different ways by different countries. In consequence, some consultations are 
heralded as successes of proactive relationship-building while other consultations are 
seen as dominated by business interests.6 At worst, governments and developers may 
employ token consultations only to curtail indigenous protests, whereby communi-
ties are further disempowered.7 
To enhance clarity on the general meaning of the duty to consult, one interpreta-
tion advanced by legal scholars is based on the so-called sliding scale theory in rela-
tion to indigenous self-determination, namely that “the more important the issue to 
the indigenous people’s culture, society and way of life, the greater influence the peo-
ple should be allowed to exercise over the decision-making process”.8 Such a view 
underpins efforts to clarify consultation procedures. For instance, in parts of Canada, 
such as British Columbia, the provincial government approaches the determination 
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of the extent of engagement with indigenous communities proportionate to i) the 
strength of indigenous rights (e.g. to culture or to land and resources) and ii) the 
severity of the expected impacts on these rights.9 Similarly, it has become an estab-
lished legal principle in Canada that government decisions (such as licenses for new 
development projects) are at risk of nullification by courts if the state duty to consult 
has not been properly executed.10 
In relation to these international debates, Sweden offers a particularly timely 
case to learn about how the implementation of the state duty to consult indigenous 
communities is unfolding in practice, being at a crucial juncture in Sami politics. In 
September 2017, the Swedish government launched its proposal for a bill on the 
duty to consult the Sami people.11 Intended by the state to become the first legally 
enshrined duty to consult with the Sami people in accordance with Sweden’s interna-
tional obligations, this proposal has attracted considerable debate.12 In their commen-
taries, several corporations and their branch organizations found it overly progressive, 
creating new regulatory uncertainties and threatening industry interests. Sami orga-
nizations and indigenous rights lawyers, in contrast, found it wanting – amongst other 
things, arguing that it lacked proper recognition of Sami material rights to property 
and culture and provided insufficient opportunities to meaningfully influence deci-
sions. Although opinions were mixed, several Sami organizations in fact rejected it 
altogether.13 At the time of writing, the fate of the proposal is uncertain: the govern-
ment ultimately proved unable to reach agreement between its ministries and finalize 
the proposal for legislative action in parliament before the September 2018 general 
elections. It remains to be seen how, if at all, a new government will progress with the 
draft proposal and various submissions from concerned parties.
In this paper, what interests us the most, is the assumption espoused by the gov-
ernment in conjunction with the proposed bill, that state authorities are already fully 
equipped to enact a new duty to consult. The government defends this view with 
reference to the fact that, as we outline further below, Swedish legislation already 
sets out duties to provide indigenous Sami communities with access to effective 
participation, with the interlinked assumption that state authorities thus must be 
aware of and able to implement such duties. For instance, the proposal suggests, in 
its impact assessment, that “affected government agencies generally have established 
procedures in place for consulting Sami representatives”.14 A similar assumption 
underpins the government’s recently proposed revision of the ethnic minority law, 
namely that during implementation “it can be assumed that public actors…have 
general awareness of existing legislation…and [will only face] minor uncertainties in 
defining further actions prompted by new legislation”.15 
We argue, in contrast, that such claims resonate poorly with existing knowledge 
of implementation failures on Sami procedural rights. Swedish Sápmi (the custom-
ary lands of the Sami now located within the nation state of Sweden) is character-
ized by a high degree of conflict over land and resource decisions, with growing 
number of court challenges and protests from Sami communities.16 This situation is 
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conditioned by a general tendency in Swedish natural resource policies to delegate 
responsibility for engaging Sami communities (in so-called ‘samråd’ or corporate 
consultations) to developers. Meanwhile, sectoral legislation in the most important 
resource sectors, such as mining, forestry, and wind power operations, remains silent 
on the duty of the state to engage in direct consultation with the Sami people.17 
Indeed, Sweden has received widespread and repeated criticism from international 
bodies for its failure to comply with obligations to protect Sami rights, including but 
not limited to the issue of effective procedures to ensure Sami influence in land and 
resource decisions on traditional lands.18 As noted above, such criticism was, in fact, 
a main motivation for the government to launch its proposal for the bill on a duty 
to consult.19 
In connection with our earlier work we received indications that many state offi-
cials, contrary to the official government position, are, in fact, fully aware of this 
implementation gap.20 Thus motivated, our task in this paper is to explore the actual 
ability of Swedish state actors to enact the duty to consult, as perceived by the indi-
vidual state officials and affected Sami communities. Without an accurate under-
standing of the current state of affairs, and knowledge of key issues to be addressed, 
it is impossible to know whether the proposed bill (whether in its original form or in 
some potential future, revised form) will lead to the expected outcomes. We structure 
our argument around one broad research question: How do Sami communities and 
state officials perceive the prerequisites for enacting the state duty to consult Sami 
communities in relation to natural resource developments? In other words, what 
are the key issues standing in the way of successful implementation? To address this 
question, we present novel empirical material, collating views from Sami communi-
ties and state officials in the key ministries and agencies working on land use issues. 
Since a specific national law outlining the duty to consult the Sami people in 
accordance with international indigenous rights law is not yet in place in Sweden, 
the way we go about answering our question is by means of a “proxy”. As alluded to 
above and as we outline in detail below (section 3), a state duty to provide opportu-
nities for the Sami to effectively participate in land and resource decisions is, in fact, 
already enshrined in Swedish law. While it is often ignored, since 2009 the law on 
ethnic minorities (law 2009:724) has set out a state duty to promote the possibility 
for the Sami to maintain and develop their culture and ensure Sami communities’ 
effective participation in decision making when decisions concern them. 
Evidently, this duty is rooted in national minority law, which read alone does 
not clearly show the full register of indigenous rights, e.g. Sami rights to land and 
resources.21 Yet, as we outline below, and in line with expert opinion, the minority law 
should, in fact, be interpreted broadly in view of and in conformity with Sweden’s 
obligations towards the Sami as an indigenous people, including Sami rights to tradi-
tional lands. While the Swedish state thus far has largely failed to apply the minority 
law in such a way as to give the intended protection for traditional Sami lands or 
the opportunity for the Sami to influence the use of such lands, the lessons from its 
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implementation are highly relevant in light of the proposed bill on a duty to consult. 
That is, in preparing for a new duty, we should examine what we can learn from the 
(lack of) implementation of an already existing duty. 
2. Material and Method
The primary source of data for this paper is a two-day workshop convened 4-5 May 
2017, in a process that took about one year to plan, execute, and analyze. The study 
grew out of a long-term process of participatory action research with a range of part-
ners among Sami communities and in collaboration with state agencies, fostering a 
process of reflection on shared as well as diverging perspectives on land use plan-
ning.22 We have elsewhere reflected at length on the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of designing such a critical collaborative dialogue between state and 
indigenous Sami actors; our focus here is on substantial findings.23 The central ques-
tion posed in the workshop was how state agencies tasked with land use planning 
and licensing of resource developments on traditional Sami lands in Sweden can 
enact their duties, i.e. to promote reindeer herding as a central part of Sami culture 
and provide opportunities for Sami communities to effectively participate in land 
and resource decisions. In so doing, we sought to unpack what, in fact, this legal 
duty means in terms of everyday practice, and the enabling/disabling conditions for 
its implementation. 
An essential design principle of the workshop was to bring the Sami communi-
ties and state officials together. Following international norms of indigenous self- 
determination (see further discussion below in section 3), this approach allowed 
Sami communities themselves to define the conditions under which Sami culture is 
to be meaningfully promoted. The state authorities, in turn, had the chance to iden-
tify the factors affect their ability to provide these conditions.24 Another important 
design principle was to invite two legal experts to explain the legal duties and answer 
questions of a legal nature: Marie B. Hagsgård, Swedish expert on the Advisory 
Committee for the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, and Debbie Chan, Legal Counsel, Indigenous Legal Relations, British 
Columbia Ministry of Attorney General. British Columbia was chosen as a relevant 
counter-example that could inspire new thinking on the topic since, contrary to 
Sweden, it has had a well-established consultation procedure in place since 2010.25
In total, 34 people participated in the workshop, including the researchers and the 
two legal experts (Table 1). Participants received prior information that their contri-
butions would be used in our research, ascribing contributions to the participating 
organizations, but not individuals. A workshop report, summarizing the process and 
results, was shared with participants with an invitation to comment and suggest cor-
rections.26 Following the workshop, the results were also presented to the Swedish 
government’s inter-ministerial commission on Sami policy, following an invitation 
from the Ministry of Culture.
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Table 1. Participants at the workshop (excluding researchers and facilitators).
Organization No. of individuals
Swedish Sami Association and six Sami communities 9
Sami Parliament 2
Ministry of Culture 1
Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation 3
County Administrative Board of Norrbotten 2
County Administrative Board of Västernorrland 2
Environmental Protection Agency 3
Energy Agency 1
Forestry Agency 1
Mineral Inspectorate 1
Total 25
3. The Duty to Promote Conditions for the Sami to Maintain and Develop 
their Culture and to Ensure Effective Participation
Since 2010, the Swedish Constitution (Ch. 1 §2 constitution act 2010:1408) has rec-
ognized the duty of the state to promote opportunities for the Sami as an indigenous 
people to maintain and develop their culture and ways of life. The law on national 
minorities (law 2009:724) sets out the more specific state duty to actively promote 
conditions necessary for the Sami to maintain and develop their culture and to provide 
opportunities for effective participation in decision making when decisions concern ques-
tions that are important to them. Both the 2010 amendment to the Constitution and 
the law on national minorities §4 (duty to promote the conditions for Sami to main-
tain and develop their culture) and §5 (duty to provide opportunities for effective 
participation of the Sami) were phrased with the explicit intention of giving effect 
to the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(specifically articles. 5 and 15).27 
Since the Sami are not only a national minority, but also an indigenous people, 
all decisions that concern the use of their traditional land should be considered of 
importance to them when implementing the law on national minorities. However, 
the Swedish government has so far chosen not to be clear as to how the rights evoked 
in the Constitution and the minority law apply to land and resources. Instead, the 
government has focused on the application of the minority law exclusively in mat-
ters such as education and language.28 Arguably, this has further provoked a divide 
between government sectors, undermining the possibility for the minority law to 
concretely guide the ministries and agencies concerned with resource exploitation. 
However, legal interpretations by the European Expert Committee clearly explain 
that the duty to ensure effective participation for the Sami people under national 
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minority law should, in fact, be interpreted in view of and in conformity with Sweden’s 
obligations towards the Sami as an indigenous people.29 The Advisory Committee 
has among other things stated that for all minorities that are indigenous peoples the 
use of their traditional land is at the heart of their culture: “representatives of [indig-
enous peoples] should therefore be closely involved in any decision-making on land 
rights and land usage in their traditional areas of residency”.30 Significantly, the Sep-
tember 2018 recommendations from the Council of Europe showed that European 
political leaders share this view, i.e. that further actions by Sweden to implement the 
national minority law must explicitly consider Sami culture as encompassing rights 
to land and resources.31
Reindeer herding is a central part of Sami culture, and state agencies with a man-
date to make land and resource decisions on reindeer herding lands must, according 
to the legislation referred to above and legal interpretation, thereby ensure that Sami 
reindeer herding communities (sameby, henceforth simply ‘Sami communities’) can 
effectively influence their decisions. This possibility for Sami communities to influ-
ence decisions affecting their traditional lands is one important way for state author-
ities to promote the possibility for the Sami to maintain and develop their culture.32 
Based on traditional uses of land and resources, Swedish courts have recognized 
that Sami communities have property rights, particularly reindeer herding rights but 
also fishing and hunting rights.33 While user rights extend over all Sápmi, for his-
toric reasons reindeer herding rights are seen as particularly strong on crown lands 
in the high mountains in Sweden, where reindeer herding has specific protection 
against other land uses (above the so-called “cultivation border” and on the “rein-
deer grazing mountains”).34 However, thus far, government agencies or courts have 
not interpreted this protection to mean that reindeer herding rights are prioritized 
above development projects, such as wind power operations or mineral exploitation, 
or that affected Sami communities are entitled to compensation for infringements 
in these situations. In addition to affected Sami communities, state agencies must 
also consider the need to consult the Sami Parliament (since it formally represents 
the public interests of the Sami people) and potentially affected Sami civil society 
associations.35 
The duty of the Swedish state to provide opportunities for effective participation 
(§5 in the minority law) is, like the duty to consult and participatory rights more gen-
erally, procedural in nature. Consultation (in the minority law expressed as the “pos-
sibility to exert influence”) here offers a mechanism for state agencies to ascertain if 
they are duly promoting conditions for the Sami to maintain and develop their cul-
ture by providing Sami communities with opportunities to effectively influence state 
decisions and define what actions are needed to promote their culture.36 It should be 
noted, though, that the part of the duty that demands the promotion of Sami culture 
(§4 in the minority law) is, in fact, a substantive commitment requiring positive state 
action. That is, irrespective of what procedures the government applies, it still has 
a duty to clarify potential impacts and avoid significant harm on substantive Sami 
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rights to land and resources. This may require governments to reject proposals for 
resource developments altogether if they would result in significant cultural harm 
and/or to seek to reach agreements on licensing through various accommodation 
measures (including mitigation and compensation).37 
In Sweden, the interpretation of what degree of influence affected indigenous 
communities must have on state decisions, i.e. what “effective participation” means 
in different situations, remains ambiguous. For instance, at present, there has been 
no clarification through law or court rulings of what degree of influence is acceptable 
under different conditions, or the situations in which the duty to ensure effective 
participation implies a duty to ensure actual Sami consent. Looking to European 
law, the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(art. 15) only states that: “State Parties [must] ensure that [indigenous communi-
ties’] participation has a substantial influence…and that there is, as far as possible, 
a shared ownership of the decisions taken” (ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, point 19) 
(emphasis added). Likewise, a rule of nullification based on failed execution of the 
duty to ensure effective participation does not yet exist in Swedish law (nor, to our 
knowledge, in any other European Union member states). 
4. Results and Analysis: Enacting State Duties 
In this section, we present the substantial findings from the workshop described 
above (section 2). The purpose is to show how Sami communities and state officials 
in the key ministries and agencies in resource sectors view their legal duty, what 
this means concretely in terms of their everyday practice and the enabling/disabling 
conditions they identified regarding implementation. When relevant, we also con-
nect key arguments based on the empirical evidence to theory based on secondary 
sources. The section is structured in three parts, showing how barriers and opportu-
nities identified by Sami communities and state officials are not confined to any sin-
gle level of governance but exist across scales. That is, they range from issues linked 
to everyday practice (sub-section 4.1: knowledge and routines and the resources to 
make improvements on these) over regulatory concerns (sub-section 4.2: sectoral 
legislation, institutions and coordination) to deeper political discourses (sub-section 
4.3: politically framed ideas of “win-win” and “co-existence”). 
4.1 Knowledge, routines and resources
A main finding regards widespread uncertainty among state officials as to the con-
crete meaning of the duties placed upon them, including a perceived lack of knowl-
edge, competence and routines. As one official stated: “Everyone at our agency needs 
to know more about indigenous rights”. State officials expressed an urgent need to 
ensure long-term staffing of personnel with expertise in Sami culture and reindeer 
herding and competence development, including both the induction of new recruits 
and further education and training. Officials elaborated on how issues of staffing and 
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competence gaps mean that government institutions often lack basic knowledge of 
reindeer herding to be able to meaningfully engage with the Sami communities in 
an assessment of impacts of other land uses and resource projects. Knowledge gaps 
also relate to what the duty to ensure effective participation entails in practice. These 
messages from the Sami communities and state officials offer a strikingly different 
view of reality compared to the view presented in recent policy documents, which 
deny the existence of any substantial capacity gaps. In other words, in many cases, 
staff within public authorities do not, in their own opinion have the basic capacity to 
implement their duties because they do not know what is expected of them; they are 
unaware of Sami cultural practices and how they are affected by other land uses; and 
they do not have the routines and resources in place to carry out expected actions. 
Besides competence development, several officials expressed an interest in nego-
tiating so-called ‘consultation check lists’ in conjunction with Sami communities, 
i.e. guidance documents to clarify what constitutes mutually agreed processes for 
consultation in the context of their different sectors. For instance, the County 
Boards concluded in their working group on the second day that they had a need for 
“a checklist [outlining the procedures for how Sami actors want to be consulted] …
developed with Sami communities and the Sami Parliament”. In a similar vein, the 
recent evaluation of the law on ethnic minorities pointed to the fact that represen-
tatives of both national minorities and local state authorities have called for clearer 
guidelines as to how to provide opportunities for effective participation.38 Such fur-
ther guidance could build on and concretize already-existing recommendations, 
such as the guidelines issued by the UN Development Group.39
Taken together, one overarching message from the public authorities was that many 
aspects of practice can thus be improved within the existing regulatory framework – 
if adequate resources are provided. While consultation checklists are an example of 
new routines that could be relatively easily developed, the necessary competence 
development identified by the civil servants cannot be achieved within the existing 
budgetary constraints. The proposed bill for a duty to consult can in this regard 
be perceived as problematic, since it assumes that state authorities will not need 
any significant additional resources for implementation, and does not recommend 
any further resources for this purpose. The voices of state officials stand in stark 
contrast to this view, pointing to already existing problems caused by an increased 
‘projectification’ of their work, which has led to the disappearance of permanent 
staff with knowledge of Sami culture and reindeer herding and with long-standing 
relationships with and knowledge of Sami communities. As one official commented, 
“[agencies] have experienced a loss of resources, but the government still expects 
things to happen…”.
The issue of a lack of resources was viewed as equally, or even more critical by the 
Sami communities. They were unequivocal in their call for the state to step up finan-
cial support to the Swedish Sami Association and individual Sami communities, so 
that they could effectively and equitably participate in the existing or envisioned 
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modes of consultation. Today, Sami communities are often-times swamped in admin-
istrative tasks and requests from government agencies and developers to participate 
in meetings concerning new resource decisions that nonetheless provide very limited 
opportunities to influence decisions. 
A major insight from the discussion was thus that providing Sami communities 
with adequate resources is in the direct interest of state agencies. In the words of 
one Sami participant: “To implement your duties, you need us to help you”. This 
view is equally supported by both state officials and Sami representatives in our 
earlier studies.40 Indeed, the Advisory Committee for the Framework convention 
for the protection of national minorities has also highlighted the importance of eco-
nomic investments to ensure that indigenous peoples such as the Sami may prepare 
for meaningful consultations.41 Another Sami community representative explained 
why this is the case: “Technical measures provided by developers will never ensure 
the promotion of Sami culture – the solutions must come from Sami communities 
themselves”. In sum, additional resources were considered a prerequisite if Sami 
communities were to support state officials in fulfilling their duties. 
4.2 Sectoral legislation, institutions and coordination
A major concern for both Sami communities and state officials regards the barriers 
at an institutional level in natural resource governance. Most participants advocated 
a shift from today’s sectoral approach with decisions made one project at a time to a 
more holistic and landscape-based approach to land use planning and resource deci-
sions. Indeed, it is well known how Sami rights are generally poorly protected, if at 
all, in land use planning and in the licensing of development projects. Among other 
things, this is the result of a “slicing and dicing” of issues concerning Sami rights into 
single industry projects and a widespread failure to account for the cumulative social 
and cultural impacts on Sami culture and rights.42
The failure to recognize Sami rights in land use planning and licensing has the 
direct effect of undermining state officials’ ability to enact their duties to ensure 
Sami communities’ effective participation. For instance, the permitting process for 
a wind farm is fragmented into separate permits for the wind farm itself, the related 
gravel pit, roads, and power corridors etc. This fragmentation makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the affected Sami communities – and the responsible state officials – 
to grasp the full picture in terms of the impacts of the proposed project, not to 
mention the cumulative effects of the proposed project in combination with already 
existing developments. This, in turn, hampers their ability to make informed judge-
ments.43 To address such challenges, one proposal that garnered much support was 
for the government to appoint a single coordinating government body to issue guid-
ance documents, and to instruct and follow-up on enactment of duties by all sectoral 
agencies in order to ensure policy coherence as regards the duty to ensure effective 
participation.
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More fundamentally, however, sectoral legislation often-times comprises a stum-
bling block for state officials in enacting their duty to ensure Sami communities’ 
effective participation. The Mineral Inspectorate, for instance, was struggling to 
identify any maneuvering space to ensure effective participation for Sami commu-
nities within the Minerals Act (law no. 1991:45): “We can do nothing… the duty 
[to consult during mineral concession permitting] is on the County Boards”. In 
turn, it was apparent that the County Boards commonly look only to Environmental 
Code (law no 1998:808) requirements to ensure that developers hold meetings to 
exchange information with Sami communities (corporate consultations, or ‘sam-
råd’) while carrying out the environmental impact assessments. Meanwhile, it is well 
known that the quality of the meetings held by developers with the Sami commu-
nities commonly leave much to be desired regarding the requirement of effective 
participation with little possibility for the Sami to actually influence decisions made 
by state authorities (see section 1). As one Sami community chairperson stated: “I’ve 
been to numerous meetings but have never been listened to. [Samråd] has become 
a word of abuse!”.
The emerging picture is multilayered and complex: First, sectoral legislation does 
not refer to the existing duty to ensure Sami communities’ effective participation 
in line with the national minority law (nor the duty to consult in conformity with 
Sweden’s obligations towards the Sami as an indigenous people). Second, state offi-
cials and agencies are generally more committed to sectoral legislation than to their 
duty to promote the possibility for the Sami to maintain and develop their culture by 
ensuring Sami communities’ effective participation. The result is that general state 
duties, rooted in the Constitution and in international law, and set out explicitly in 
the law on ethnic minorities, are not applied by state agencies in the intended way 
when contested land and resource decisions are made. 
A key finding is thus about how, as Elinor Ostrom has aptly observed for other 
natural resource management situations, the actual rules of practice differ from the 
presumed rules of law.44 The general legal principle is namely that state agencies 
should apply the law in conformity with Sweden’s international treaty obligations.45 
However, today, state officials in several state agencies are clearly unaware of their 
existing duty based on the minority law or what it entails in practice. As such, they 
are prone to fail to ensure the right of the Sami to effective participation in land and 
resource decisions on Sami traditional lands. 
4.3 Political discourses: “co-existence”, “win-win” and Sami communities as 
“stakeholders”
Several political discourses prove to play a significant role in shaping the way state 
officials interpret sectoral legislation and opt to enact or ignore their duty towards 
the Sami. During the workshop it came to the fore how discourse centered on the 
concept of “co-existence” between Sami reindeer herding and development projects 
Implementing the State Duty to Consult in Land and Resource Decisions
15
severely constrains the ability of state officials to enact their duty. This discourse, 
dominant in the Swedish debate concerning conflicts between Sami communities 
and competing land uses, emphasizes the possibility of “win-win” situations in which 
reindeer herding and the proposed new development projects can co-exist through 
adoption of mitigation measures. That is, the notion of co-existence is evoked by 
politicians and developers alike to propagate what is effectively a myth that Sami 
reindeer herding is inherently and endlessly “adaptable”, and hence not significantly 
impacted by developments, i.e. it can “co-exist” with rapidly expanding mining, 
hydropower and wind power operations on Sami traditional lands.46
In so doing, government agencies are prone to ignore the hard reality that “win-
lose” situations are frequent when resources and land are limited. For instance, one 
state official explained how the assumption that Sami reindeer herding can co-exist 
with large development projects permeates the culture in agencies, reacting that “it 
is naive to believe that co-existence is possible. There’re limits [to exploitation] and 
real conflicts of interest exist”. Similarly, one Sami participant elaborated on how the 
discourse on co-existence is meaningless to Sami communities that are struggling 
for their very survival: “we’ve stopped talking about co-existence. For us, it’s about 
being able to even exist.” However, even though individual state officials may recog-
nize the “win-lose” character of resource decisions, the dominance of the “win-win” 
discourse within their own agencies inhibit them from acting on such observations. 
In glossing over the substantive conflicts of interest, permit decisions often fail to 
transparently account for potential negative impacts of proposed resource devel-
opments and the trade-offs agencies make between the rights of the Sami and the 
interests of developers, in turn undermining the possibility for Sami communities to 
appeal licensing decisions. 
Many participants saw the need for revisions in sectoral legislation and govern-
ment procedures if conflicts of interest should be addressed more openly and trans-
parently. This would involve, among other things: enforcing the rule that the burden 
of proof should be with the developer (currently frequently ignored);47 defining 
thresholds for the determination of significant harm on Sami rights to practice their 
culture (currently absent in Sweden);48 and recognizing that reindeer herding – like 
any other human activity – should be able not just to survive and adapt but also to 
develop and flourish. Such “development objectives”, formulated by Sami commu-
nities themselves, could help place reindeer herding on par with other land uses, 
such as renewable energy and mineral extraction, when decisions are made. 
Another limiting discourse concerned the way the Sami people and Sami organi-
zations are conceived as “stakeholders” instead of rights-holders. This is important 
since, by ignoring Sami rights to land and resources, the possibility for constructive 
intercultural relations aimed at genuine reconciliation between the majority soci-
ety and the indigenous Sami society will, then, also be limited. In other words, the 
stakeholder discourse risks leading government agencies to treat reindeer herding 
as one land user among many, failing to see reindeer herders’ unique position as 
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rights holders when making land use decisions. One example from the workshop 
concerning the lack of resources serves to substantiate this argument (see section 
4.1): During the conversations about the problems of economic resources faced 
by the Sami communities, the a participant from the Ministry of Enterprise and 
Innovation explained why it had so far been unable to provide the long-term fund-
ing requested: “The Swedish Sami Association is an interest organization and then 
special guidelines apply”. By branding the Sami Association as any other kind of 
interest organization (i.e. in line with regular Swedish civil society organizations) its 
legitimate role as a representative body for Sami reindeer herding communities as 
indigenous rightsholders is ignored. This means that the state is deflecting its obliga-
tion to engage consistently with Sami rights.49 Indeed, it is well known how, to date, 
the Swedish state has insisted on the Sami Parliament being the sole representative 
body for the Sami people.50 The weak role of the Swedish Sami Association and 
Sami communities in the proposed bill for a duty to consult was also, in fact, a core 
point of contention in many submissions from Sami actors and legal scholars, and 
highlights the need for the state to pay more attention to the Sami communities as 
rights-holding subjects. 
5. Conclusions
At this critical juncture where Sweden is preparing to legislate a duty to consult the 
Sami people, with the express aim of meeting its international treaty obligations in 
a more consistent manner, this paper has considered the lessons learned from the 
implementation of existing state duty. The duty that we have examined, as a “proxy”, 
is the duty set out in the minority law to promote the possibility for the Sami to 
maintain and develop their culture and to ensure Sami communities’ effective par-
ticipation in land and resource decisions. Contrary to popular assumption, or at 
least the publicly espoused assumptions in government policy, we have here demon-
strated the existence of considerable implementation failures. 
In so doing, to our knowledge, this paper offers the first empirical assessment of 
the views of indigenous communities and state officials themselves on the prospect 
of enacting the state duty to consult indigenous communities (or ensure their effec-
tive participation in decision making). Whereas policy debates have moved rapidly 
to encourage consultations between indigenous communities, states and developers 
in the context of natural resource developments, very little research has yet explored 
the concrete potential and the enabling/disabling conditions of such procedures and 
practices. Generally, scholarly work has tended to focus on comprehensive settle-
ments (land claims, treaties) rather than the development and implementation of 
consultation processes. Notable examples of this research into territorial solutions 
include Canada’s landmark approach to modern treaties and Aboriginal Australians’ 
struggle for native title, e.g. linked to the high court Mabo decision of 1992.51 Sim-
ilarly, intercultural dialogue has historically received scant attention in the study of 
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resource negotiations.52 To the extent available, such research has tended to focus 
on the agency of indigenous or corporate actors, including community-led plan-
ning and impact assessments and impact-benefit agreements in direct negotiation 
between communities and developers.53 Meanwhile, limited attention has been paid 
to the perspectives and agency of state officials. Arguably, such knowledge has highly 
significant societal relevance, shedding light on whether recent policy reforms are 
set to meet stated objectives to protect indigenous rights and sustainably manage 
natural resources.
What then can be learned from these experiences as the state embarks upon a new 
duty to consult the Sami people? Given past implementation failures, one key issue 
is arguably whether officials or court judges will be given the teeth to enforce new 
consultation rules and whether Sami communities will be able to hold the govern-
ment accountable if it fails to enact its new duty. If not, there is an obvious risk that 
well-intentioned reform will result in seemingly rapid improvement on paper, but 
is quickly subsumed by knowledge and capacity gaps in state institutions and (real 
and/or imagined) conflicts with sectoral legislation. Mechanisms of appeal and/or 
rules of nullification can, in this regard, play an important role. 
It is worth noting here that considerations regarding the need to clarify the degree 
of influence on decisions (as addressed in the sliding scale theory) and the poten-
tial need for a rule of nullification were, in fact, both touched upon in conjunction 
with the recent update to Sweden’s law on ethnic minorities and in the proposed 
bill on a consultation duty.54 In its recent recommendations, the Council of Europe 
also highlighted the need to introduce effective remedy in case of non-compliance. 
However, no new means of remedy have been incorporated by the government into 
the proposed legislative changes, neither for the law on national minorities, nor for 
the proposed consultation duty. As noted, to comply with their duty, and indeed to 
ensure any practical relevance for indigenous peoples, state agencies must ensure 
that Sami communities have a real influence on land and resource decisions. The 
decision to exclude principles that could have helped clarify the duty and allow for 
holding government agencies to account if they fail to enact their duty are thus likely 
to significantly reduce the effect of the duties in practice in the future.
Another key argument to arise from the findings is that it would significantly aid 
implementation if sectoral laws such as the Forestry Act, the Minerals Act, and the 
Environmental Code were amended to consistently refer to the requirement to enact 
state duties toward the Sami (as noted sectoral laws are currently silent on the state 
duty to consult or ensure effective Sami participation). One possibility would be to 
insert, in the sectoral laws, adequate references to the minority law and/or a potential 
new bill on a consultation duty, clarifying when and how the state agencies must give 
effect to these duties. It is worth mentioning that the government, in its recent review 
of how the implementation of the minority law could be strengthened, found that 
changes were required in laws in other sectors than resource development, such as 
the school law (law 2010:800), to clarify and detail the state duty to ensure effective 
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participation for minorities.55 One can wonder whether this principle of updating 
across sectoral laws should also apply to resource sectors as an essential means of 
giving effect to Sami indigenous rights. 
Despite these structural constraints, however, we have also seen that much, in 
fact, could be gained in the near-term if state officials were supported in more pro-
actively interpreting and navigating their room for maneuver within existing sectoral 
legislation. This would require the state to step up investment into resources, com-
petence development, and staffing as well as the development (together with Sami 
communities) of new routines and guidelines for consultation, in accordance with 
international law. The great need for such investment should not discourage govern-
ment, on the contrary it is emblematic of why this effort is so urgently needed in the 
first place. 
Taking a step back and reflecting on the wider theoretical implications of the 
findings, it is noteworthy that the barriers and opportunities identified by Sami com-
munities and state officials were not confined to any single level of governance but 
existed across scales. This observation resonates with wider scholarship in indigenous 
geographies and critical studies of extractivism that have articulated how indigenous 
peoples must exert struggles for their rights in multiple forums and across insti-
tutional scales.56 Indeed, often-times, indigenous peoples must – if they are to see 
meaningful change –“scale up” resistance to resource developments from project- 
by-project decisions to debate around systemic and nation-wide solutions.57 
The point here is that, when aiming to enact state duties towards indigenous peo-
ples, the “scaling” of the policy problem (i.e. the definition of the severity of the 
implementation gap and its potential range of solutions) must be relevant to the 
indigenous peoples themselves. This demonstrates how a robust understanding of 
governance of natural resources on indigenous lands requires a multi-perspectival 
and cross-scalar analysis. Arguably, research such as that delivered in this paper, has 
an important role in eliciting perspectives from indigenous communities and state 
officials themselves on the intractable policy issues they face. To be sure, indigenous 
research methodologies have helped re-center indigenous perspectives on resource 
issues, and while much work remains to be done, progress is also being made in 
Swedish Sápmi.58 Building on such scholarship, we contend that more work remains 
to be done in line with the ambition of this paper, namely inquiring about the per-
spectives of both indigenous communities and their counterparts in resource negoti-
ations, such as state officials.
On a final note, and perhaps surprisingly, our results demonstrate a relatively 
high degree of convergence in the views of the participating state officials and Sami 
communities. The “street-level bureaucrats”59 that joined the workshop were gen-
erally already aware of the lack of knowledge and skills in their organizations and 
could express these insights when allowed to deliberate upon the situation in a safe 
space disconnected from individual resource decisions. This observation challenges 
the common view in much research and public debate, namely that, when opinions 
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about the efficacy of public policy diverge, then the divide is between the state as a 
whole and indigenous representatives. 
Rather, as shown in this study, the most significant divide seems to exist within the 
state apparatus, i.e. between the national political leadership (or at least its official 
position), and street-level state officials faced with the consequences of implemen-
tation failure in their daily work, e.g. in the form of prolonged permit processes and 
escalated conflicts.60 As observed by Funder and Marani, street-level bureaucrats in 
natural resource governance tend to “occupy an ambiguous position in which they 
are expected to implement lofty laws and policies with limited means and in a com-
plex local reality”.61 Yet, problem definitions – and hence the “scaling” of the policy 
issues – are typically filtered politically by central state executives and politicians in a 
dynamic prone to create a mismatch with local realities. Our closing argument must 
thus be in favor of national government making better use of an important source of 
knowledge when it seeks to improve the enactment of state duties: its own officials 
with deep insights from their complex realities across resource sectors and within the 
different parts of Swedish Sápmi.
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